Posts Tagged ‘bribery’

How the Feds Enforce the FCPA

Monday, October 25th, 2010

 

The other day, we drew a contrast between the Manhattan DA’s new public integrity unit and the way the feds go after FCPA violations, and some folks asked just what exactly the feds do in these cases.  That’s a good question.  Especially now, as the FCPA has become a major star of the feds’ redoubled efforts to fight white-collar crime.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, among other things, says it’s against the law for any U.S. citizen or business to pay a bribe to a foreign official.  The penalties can be staggering, with fines calculated as the amount of income the briber hoped to receive down the road as a result of paying the bribe.  “Any” U.S. citizen means just that: anybody, not just a corporate executive.  A “foreign official” means anyone with a government job — including people working in industries that are government-owned or government-controlled.

“Bribery” includes giving anything of value in the hopes of getting something in return.  It’s really a broad standard.  A bribe doesn’t have to be an explicit tit-for-tat, and it doesn’t have to be just for the purpose of landing a choice contract.  A bribe can be just a nice dinner at a fancy restaurant that might make get you looked on with more favor next time contracts are being awarded.  A bribe can be a “facilitation payment” to a petty bureaucrat, some grease to ensure that you are allowed to do what you are already entitled to do (this, by the way, is an example of where Wikipedia, at least as of today, get things wrong).  See here for a more thorough discussion.

As with many white-collar offenses, this one is enforced by both the SEC and the DOJ.  As of this year, the SEC now has a special unit dedicated to investigating and punishing suspected offenders.  As we mentioned the other day, the point is to keep as much expertise in the institutional memory, and also to better coordinate investigation and enforcement.  On the criminal side, the DOJ’s Frauds Section is the main enforcer as a matter of law, though some local U.S. Attorney’s offices like the SDNY will handle most of the work in-house.

Over the past few years, the number of FCPA cases has risen dramatically, in part because the (more…)

On the Manhattan DA’s New Public Integrity Unit

Friday, October 22nd, 2010

 

As we were coming out of court the other afternoon, we got a call from one of the nice folks over at the WSJ, asking us what we thought about the Manhattan DA’s new Public Integrity unit.  We didn’t even know it had been formed — though we had heard Vance talk about the idea on the campaign trail.  The soon-to-be new DA had talked of ideas for a variety of new units, some of which we thought were good ideas (like the Wrongful Convictions unit, which would create office-wide policies while also investigating innocence claims), and some of which we thought were more public-relations than practical (like the Public Integrity unit).

As proposed by Vance, we said to the reporter, the Public Integrity unit didn’t really seem necessary.  It was to be a sub-unit of the Rackets Bureau, which has already been investigating and prosecuting public corruption cases with a fair amount of success for many years.  Carving out a specialty unit isn’t going to increase the number of cases they get, or improve their success rate, or have any extra effect on corruption beyond the usual.  It’s not like this is an area of crime that was being ignored.  Far from it.

It’s not going to increase the number of cases coming in, because that has nothing to do with whether there’s a special unit or not.  Public corruption cases are hard to come by, because usually the only people who know about the bribery are the ones benefiting from it.  And they’re not likely to self-report.  The DOI does what it can with the resources it’s got to ferret out a case here and there, but the reality is that (for the most part) law enforcement sort of lucks into these cases.

If you want to have an effect on public corruption, the trick is to either get magical surveillance powers to spot all the bribes going on, or else (more…)

What Not to Say at Sentencing

Wednesday, March 10th, 2010
Monica Conyers arriving at court for sentencing

Monica Conyers arriving at court for sentencing

Former Detroit councilwoman Monica Conyers, the wife of U.S. Representative John Conyers, was sentenced today in federal court on her guilty plea to charges of bribery. The 45-year-old was given 37 months in prison, the top end of the agreed-upon Guidelines range.

Having read the sentencing minutes, we can’t help but think she might have done better if she’d kept her mouth shut. There are some things one does not say during one’s sentencing. She seems not to have gotten the memo, and it may be that others out there don’t know either. So here are some tips:

First, do not imply that the judge is acting improperly, before the judge has even sentenced you. Don’t even hint that the judge is taking things into account that he should not be. For example, it is not a good idea to say “the newspapers have put pressure on you to try to make an example out of me.” Judges do not like to be told they’re committing an impropriety. You do not want to piss off the person who is about to decide your fate.

Seriously, people need to be told this?

Second, do not say it’s unfair that you’re going to jail, when the other people committing crimes with you got less time. If you’ve pled to taking bribes (Conyers admitted taking multiple payments in return for awarding a contract), it doesn’t matter what happened to anybody else. The only consideration is what you did, and what you deserve. So saying “all of the people who were bribing and giving the money, they got zero months, eleven months, and now they want me to go to jail for five years?” — that’s not really going to help you out. All you’re doing is calling the judge unfair to his face. And it’s irrelevant at best.

That leads right to point 3: If you’ve just got done saying you should get the same time as your fellow conspirators, it’s not a good idea to then insist that you’re innocent and your plea was involuntary. Arguing in the alternative, at least in criminal cases, only means both alternatives are wrong. Pick a story and stick with it.

Point 3-A is that you don’t react to sentencing by demanding your (more…)

Hoist on Their Own Petard — How Forensic Accountants Catch Small-Time Scammers

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

 

No law today. Let’s have a police procedural for a change. We’re in the mood for some white-collar stuff, so here goes.

Forget about the Madoff case. Most financial crimes are nowhere near as headline-worthy, nor do they involve such massive amounts of other people’s money. But smaller scams are just as likely to get prosecuted, and they’re just as much a felony as the big ones. And though the news may not report it, people get caught and convicted all the time.

And like Al Capone, the smaller scammers aren’t caught by the gun-toting detectives so much as by the green visor-wearing accountants.

It’s usually a case of self-incrimination. Defendants usually create the very evidence that puts them behind bars, in their financial books and records. Of course, most of them aren’t doing it on purpose. They’re not creating blatant records that flatly proclaim “here there be crimes.” Most take pains to avoid creating records of improper doings, and to conceal or camouflage the rest. But it is often those very attempts to hide their activities that wind up calling attention to them.

-=-=-=-

Every law enforcement agent knows that, to catch the “bad guys,” you need to follow the money. Who wound up with the cash or the assets? How did the money get from person A to person B, and so on to Mr. X?

One easy way to start is to look at public documents. Lots of records get publicly filed, for anybody to look at, and they can be good leads. Does Mr. X own a house? Pull the deed from the county clerk’s office. There’s going to be information that leads to the mortgage itself, and then Mr. X’s bank records are just a subpoena away. Probate records lead to the estate, which leads to more bank records and real estate records. Does someone have a rap sheet already? Maybe they had to post bond in an earlier case. That’s going to show the source of the lien, and lead to more assets. Dun & Bradstreet and similar records can tell whether someone has a lien against Mr. X — such people are often more than willing to give more information to law enforcement. Heck, even newspapers can be a source of leads to get an investigation started.

Paper begets paper. Or computer data. It is nigh impossible to have dealings of any significance without some record being kept somewhere, in some form.

When following leads, the investigator ought to have an idea of what he’s looking at. What kind of business is this company in? Where are they located? What do they spend money on? The investigator can’t tell whether something is unusual unless he knows what the usual looks like.

Maybe this is a kickback scheme. If I am demanding kickbacks from you, or bribes, or extortion payments so I allow you to keep doing business with me, then maybe I don’t want that money coming directly to me. And maybe you don’t want it coming directly from you. So perhaps I set up a “consulting” company to receive payments from you. Or maybe you set up a “customer” company to make payments to me. Or perhaps we do both. Maybe we have lots of shell companies, or only one. If the investigator figures it out, though, our cautions might turn around to condemn us.

Maybe you pay me with a no-show job. If so, you’d better be careful about who is holding back my payroll checks or delivering them to me. And is my pay typical of my job? A steady, constant paycheck is more typical of an office worker than a blue-collar worker, after all. These are possible tipoffs to an investigator. And paper begets paper.

-=-=-=-

So how else do they get the paper, apart from going to public records?

Subpoenas are the main stock-in-trade of the white-collar investigation team. Smart teams won’t subpoena the world, of course, because that just makes for far more work than necessary, while increasing the odds of tipping off Mr. X to the existence of the investigation. Instead, they’ll just limit their subpoenas to what they really need. Narrow requests also make more subpoenas necessary down the road, which keeps open a line of communication.

A shotgun subpoena followed by a narrower one just tips off defense attorneys like us. We see something like that, we have a chat with the client, and figure out what the investigators are probably looking for. We get all that extra time to prepare our defense.

When in doubt, utility bills are a common lead-generator, to figure out how someone is paying for their phone, cable, electricity, etc.

One thing they’ll probably want to see are old tax returns, especially for a business. Tax returns can be a mine of useful information, such as who formed the business, who the officers are, how much they get paid, who their accountant is (always a good person to interrog… ah, interview). And if the tax returns don’t match reality, well that’s another charge for the grand jury to hear, isn’t it?

The company’s accountant often did the tax returns for the owners and officers, too. Investigators can request the accountant’s retained copies of those returns, and find out all kinds of information about assets, mortgages, sources of income, etc.

Canceled checks are a high-want item. They’re one way of seeing who’s paying money to whom.

Bright investigators don’t settle for photocopies, but insist on originals. Critical information could have been whited out before copying. Photocopies are often illegible, and may not include the all-important information on the back of checks showing who deposited it and to what account.

In general, subpoenas are going to be issued to non-targets. There’s little point in asking the suspect to provide the evidence that will hang him. All it does is raise him up. And a savvy defense attorney is going to bring that client in to present the documents to the grand jury — because here in New York, for example, it is far too easy for the prosecutor to slip up and confer total transactional immunity on the client right there in the grand jury. (That’s a topic for a whole nother post.)

No, suspects aren’t usually the ones who get subpoenaed. They get searched.

-=-=-=-

Search warrants are a unique chance for the investigators to get all that stuff they never would have gotten from a subpoena. The “second set of books,” rather than the official set they keep for the IRS and other outside eyes. The secret records. (Although these can sometimes be viewed by an undercover posing as a legitimate potential buyer of the business.)

That’s what the investigators are hoping for: a “smoking gun” document of some kind. Original documents with all the info that got whited out in the subpoena response. Records of illicit payments made, cash skimmed, investors gypped. Evidence that customers were told one thing, but reality was something else entirely. It may be buried somewhere in all those boxes of docs and all those hard drives, but they can’t wait to find it.

These records may be as simple as a notebook or a wad of scratch paper. They could be as detailed as anything. Maybe there’s evidence of a cash payroll — which leads to questions of where that cash came from (the bank? really?) on top of issues of tax and benefits evasion. Maybe there’s a little black book recording paid bribes, or extortion payments received.

Search warrants are often a fine way to gain evidence of embezzlement. Maybe those personal expenses were paid for with the business’s money, or with investors’ deposits. A good search warrant team will have agents who know what they’re looking for, others speaking to the subject. Others will be busy talking to witnesses, family members, employees and others at the location, letting them think the cops know exactly what’s going on, so they’d better come clean.

In a suspect’s home, the search team might see pictures of that really nice boat, or expensive collections, or the like. Investigators love to see things like that, especially when the checkbook doesn’t show those expenses. A lifestyle and possessions beyond one’s official means is going to make them poke around for illegitimate sources of cash.

Obviously, the execution of a search warrant means the investigation ain’t a secret any more. So these usually come at the end of an investigation.

-=-=-=-=-

So how about some examples. Let’s say I have ABC company. Law enforcement subpoenaed or seized a bunch of payroll checks. Every week, my company is cutting a few dozen checks to employees. They all look totally legit, until one of the forensic accountants notices that Joe Blow tends to deposit four or five checks at a time, all on the same day. That means he’s probably not getting them each week like a normal employee, but is receiving a bunch of them once a month. That is typical of a no-show job. Joe Blow and I are now just that much closer to getting caught. Thanks, Joe.

Meanwhile, my manufacturing company DEF sends out invoices every month or so to Jack Nimble, charging tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars for all kinds of different products being delivered. Payment is due on receipt, send the check to my headquarters at 1405 Blank Lane, Suite 120. Unfortunately, the forensic accountant noticed that each month’s invoice number is one more than the previous month’s. Do I only have one customer, for all these things I’m selling? And Suite 120 turns out to be a mail drop box number. Suspicious. They’re going to watch that box and I.D. who uses it, and maybe figure out who’s paying for it. And due on receipt? Someone’s standing on the loading dock with a check for a couple hundred grand? No way. And anyway, how come there are no bills of lading, shipping records, or anything else indicating this really happened? This looks like Jack Nimble is paying me some kickbacks through a shell company.

Original checks are a treasure trove. I’m cutting tons of them to small suppliers, nothing more than $9500 or so. Oddly enough, however, they all tend to get cashed at the same check-cashing joint. They’re not deposited to anyone’s accounts. Looks like I’m laundering some money. Investigators are going to check up on these companies to see if they’re legit, maybe subpoena invoices, bills of lading and purchase order forms to see what’s going on.

Doctors: Got “Incentives?” Better Get a Lawyer.

Friday, March 20th, 2009

 

We’ve written about an upcoming wave of white-collar prosecutions, especially against Wall Street types. But wait, there’s more: the feds are now about to start prosecuting doctors.

The Department of Justice and the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services are about to start prosecuting physicians who receive inappropriate incentives from manufacturers and sellers of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Doctors who have accepted such incentives face criminal prosecution, as well as civil fines and being barred from participation in Medicare and Medicaid programs. Doctors who have received significant incentives from medical marketers might want to seriously consider consulting a good white-collar defense attorney.

Of course, incentives are a commonplace in medical marketing. And of course the purpose is to somehow influence which drug a doctor intends to prescribe, or what equipment a doctor uses. A wide range of incentives are offered, not just the free pens, prescription pads and trinkets routinely handed out. Expensive equipment can be provided for free or at a deep discount, in return for minimal obligations such as a product recommendation or letting one’s office be used (albeit rarely) as a training facility. In extreme cases, sellers actually pick up the tab for travel to seminars or other expenses, pay “advances on royalties” for helping develop products, or simply pay cash kickbacks.

In the past, it has usually been the manufacturers who got prosecuted for making kickbacks or bribes, often paying millions in fines and undertaking the supervision of monitors. What’s new now is the federal focus on the doctors themselves, on the receiving end.

Many doctors may not think they’re doing anything wrong by accepting incentives from sales folk. After all, it’s the norm. And so what if a doctor got a free trip to the conference, if he continues to make his prescription decisions independently and based on the actual needs of the individual patient?

The government sees this as criminal partly because such payments are opaque. A patient might not be so trusting of a prescription for FancyPharm if he knew his doctor was getting comped by that company. A patient might not have the same confidence in her eye surgeon if she knew that he didn’t actually select and purchase his laser equipment himself, but instead got it for nothing.

Another reason is the perception that medicines and procedures would be improperly prescribed, because the incentives had an undue influence on the doctor’s decisions. Unnecessary expense and harm could result.

The main tool that prosecutors have here is the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (formally known as “the Medicate and Medicaid Patient Protection Act of 1987,” 42 U.S.C § 1320a-7b). It basically provides up to 5 years imprisonment and $25,000 in fines.

The feds are most likely to go after those who allowed marketers to pay for their consulting fees, travel to seminars or other expenses, or who accepted advances or payments, or who accepted large rebates or extreme discounts without proportionate consideration, or otherwise received remuneration that could have influenced their decision making.

Lewis Morris, chief counsel for the Inspector General, told the New York Times last week that “what we need to do is make examples of a couple of doctors, so that their colleagues see that this isn’t worth it.”

When law enforcement says they are going to make examples of people, one might think that this means they will carefully pick and choose their cases, cherry-picking only the most obviously criminal acts with the strongest evidence. However, in real life, that’s not always the case.

Especially in cases like these, where the evidence tends to be more circumstantial (absent clearly incriminating admissions, recordings or emails), and where the conduct is very often in the gray area of culpability, prosecutors may not have many rock-crusher cases in the first place. And they certainly won’t have enough cases at first to do much cherry-picking in any event.

No, they have announced their desire to make examples of people, and we predict they will go after whatever crosses their desk.

Cases are going to come from marketers who got caught trying to bribe someone else, who are then flipped to inform (and wear a wire) against the other doctors they deal with. Those are the easiest cases for law enforcement to initiate. Other cases may come from third-party complaints or referrals, but those are rare in secret one-on-one deals such as those being investigated here.

If any doctors out there think they might have had dealings with a marketer that could get them in trouble, it might be wise to get counsel from a good white-collar defense attorney sooner rather than later.

Milberg Partners Sentenced for Class-Action Kickbacks

Tuesday, October 28th, 2008

Attorneys Sentenced

Milberg LLP partners David Bershad and Steven Schulman were sentenced in federal court yesterday afternoon, each receiving 6 months in prison. Along with two other partners, they had been convicted for offenses arising our of the payment of kickbacks to lead plaintiffs in securities and shareholder class actions, which netted the firm more than a quarter of a Billion dollars in attorney fees.

These 6-month sentences were far less than what the other two partners were given earlier this year: William Lerach got 24 months, and Melvyn Weiss got 30.

At Bershad’s sentencing hearing, U.S. District Judge John Walter intitially indicated that he thought Bershad ought to get the same sentence as Lerach, as they had pled to the same conduct. Bershad’s lawyers sought probation, and the prosecution asked for 3 months in prison plus 3 months of community confinement. Apparently swayed by Bershad’s statement of remorse, letters of support, and the fact that Bershad’s plea was the first domino that led to the other pleas, the judge came down to the six-month jail term.

At Schulman’s sentencing hearing, the prosecution asked for a year in prison, as Schulman had taken longer to plea than Bershad, and so had provided less assistance. Schulman’s lawyer argued that the sentence should be no longer than Bershad’s, and that the delay in pleading guilty was due to attempts to work out a plea that would let Schulman keep his law license — notwithstanding the fact that there was no way he could conceivably keep that license given what had happened. Judge Walter wasn’t impressed with those arguments, but ultimately gave him the same 6-month sentence, taking into consideration the letters in support and the fact that Schulman had three young children who would be affected by a longer sentence.

Bershad had pled to conspiracy to obstruct justice, and to making false statements under oath. Schulman had pled to a racketeering charge. In addition to jail terms, each was sentenced to pay a $250,000 fine, on top of forfeitures of $7.75 million and $1.85 million, respectively.

Milberg LLP was formerly known as Milberg Weiss LLC, and as Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP. At one time, it accounted for half of all securities class action settlements. The firm engaged in “strike suits,” wherein a corporation whose share price had fallen would be sued in a shareholder class action, with an individual shareholder identified as the class representative. The suits were brought for the purpose of settlement for nuisance value. Individual shareholders did not approach the firm, but rather the firm monitored the stock market and manufactured its own cases. To get individuals to to take the role of lead plaintiff, the firm would share its fees with them. The firm also paid kickbacks to stockbrokers who referred clients. At least one expert witness, specializing in estimating damages, was paid on a contingency-fee basis. Bershad and Schulman were indicted, along with the firm, in 2006 on various counts, including racketeering, mail fraud and bribery.